But we are not of them who draw back unto perdition; but of them that believe to the saving of the soul.
— Hebrews 10:39
Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.
— Galatians 2:16
But the scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe.
— Galatians 3:22
For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them.
— Ephesians 2:10
Therefore if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new.
— 2 Corinthians 5:17
And I will give them an heart to know me, that I am the LORD: and they shall be my people, and I will be their God: for they shall return unto me with their whole heart.
— Jeremiah 24:7
I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service. And be not conformed to this world: but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God.
— Romans 12:1-2
Whether the Existence of a Holy Disposition of Heart is Necessary to Believing, by Andrew Fuller. The following contains the Appendix of his work, “The Gospel Worthy of All Acceptation.” Published in Philadelphia in 1805.
Appendix.
Whether the existence of a holy disposition of heart is necessary to believing.
It is not from a fondness for controversy that I am induced to offer my sentiments on this subject. I feel myself called upon to do so on two accounts.
First, The leading principle in the foregoing treatise is implicated in the decision of it. If no holy disposition of heart is presupposed or included in believing, it has nothing holy in it; and if it has nothing holy in it, it is absurd to plead for its being a duty. God requires nothing as a duty which is merely natural, or intellectual, or in which the will has no concern.
Secondly, Mr. Mc’Lean, in a Second Edition of his treatise on The Commission of Christ, has published several pages of animadversions 108 on what I have advanced on this subject, and has charged me with very serious consequences; consequences which, if substantiated, will go to prove that I have subverted the great doctrine of Justification By Grace Alone, without the works of the law.109 It is true he has made no mention of my name; owing, I suppose, to what I had written as contained in two private letters, one of which was addressed to him. I certainly had no expectation when I wrote those letters that what I advanced would have been publicly answered. I do not pretend to understand so much of the etiquette of writing, as to decide whether this conduct was proper. But if it were, some people may be tempted to think that it is rather dangerous corresponding with authors. I have no desire, however, to complain on this account, nor indeed on any other, except that my sentiments are very partially stated, and things introduced so much out of their connection, that it is impossible for the reader to form any judgment concerning them.
I have the pleasure to agree with Mr. M. in considering the belief of the gospel as a saving faith. Our disagreement on this subject is confined to the question, What does the belief of the gospel include? Mr. M. explains it so carefully as to exclude every exercise of the heart or will, as either being included in it, or having any influence upon it. Whatever of this exists in a believer, he considers as belonging to the effects of faith, rather than to faith itself. If I understand him, he pleads for such a belief of the gospel that it has nothing in it of a holy nature, nothing of conformity to the moral law “in heart or life;” a passive reception of the truth, in which the will has no concern; and this is because it is opposed to the works of the law in the article of justification.
On this ground, he accounts for the apostle’s language in Romans 4.5. To him that does not work, but believes on him who justifies the ungodly; understanding by the terms, he that does not work, one who has done nothing yet which is pleasing to God; and by the term ungodly, one who is actually an enemy to God. He does not suppose that God justifies unbelievers. If therefore He justifies sinners, while in a state of enmity against him, there can be nothing in the nature of faith but what may consist with it. And it is true, if faith has nothing in it of a holy nature, nothing of conformity to the divine law“in heart or life,” nothing of the exercise of any holy disposition of heart, it cannot designate the subjects of it as godly. Godliness must in this case consist merely in the fruits of faith. And these fruits being subsequent to justification, the sinner must of course be justified antecedent to his being the subject of godliness, or while he is actually the enemy of God.
If Mr. M. had only affirmed that faith is opposed to works, even to every good disposition of the heart, as the ground of acceptance with God; that we are not justified by it as a work; or that whatever moral goodness it may possess, it is not such that it is imputed to us for righteousness, there would have been no dispute between us. But he rejects this distinction, and endeavors to improve the caution of those who use it, into a tacit acknowledgment that their views of faith were very liable to misconstruction: in other words, that they border on the doctrine of justification by works in so great a degree, as to be in danger of being mistaken for its advocates. 111 He is not contented with faith being opposed to works in point of justification: it must also be opposed to them in its own nature. “Paul,” he affirms,“did not look upon faith as a work.” In short, if there is any possibility of drawing a certain conclusion from what a writer has advanced, in almost every form of speech, it must be concluded that he means to deny that there is anything holy in the nature of faith; and that if it could be separated from its effects (as he supposes it is in justification) it would leave the person who possessed it, among the enemies of God.
Notwithstanding the above, however, Mr. M. allows faith to be a duty. He has largely, and I believe successfully, endeavored to prove that “faith is the command of God “—that it is “part of obedience to God” — that “to believe all that God says is right” — and that unbelief, which is its opposite, is “a great and heinous sin.” 112 But how can these things agree? If there is nothing of the exercise of a holy disposition in what is commanded of God, in what is right, and in what is an exercise of obedience, then by what rule are we to judge what is holy, and what is not? I can scarcely conceive of a truth more self-evident than this: That God’s commands extend only to that which comes under the influence of the will. Knowledge can be no further a duty, nor ignorance a sin, than as each is influenced by the moral state of the heart; and the same is true of faith and unbelief. We might as well make the passive admission of light into the eye, or of sound into the ear, duties, as a passive admission of truth into the mind. To receive it into the heart, indeed is duty; for this is a voluntary acquiescence in it: but that in which the will has no concern cannot possibly be so.
Mr. M. sometimes writes as if he would acknowledge faith to be not only a duty, but to “contain virtue,” or true holiness; seeing, as he observes, that “it is the root of all Christian virtues, and that which gives glory to God, and without which it is impossible to please him.” Indeed, the reader would imagine, by his manner of writing, that he was pleading for the holy nature of faith, and that I had denied it, seeing that I am represented as having made the “too bold,” and “unfounded assertion,” that mere belief contains no virtue. The truth is, I affirmed no such thing, but was pleading for the contrary; as is manifest from what Mr. M. says in the same note: “But why so solicitous to find virtue or moral excellence in faith?” It is true, I contended that if the belief of the gospel were a mere exercise of the understanding, uninfluenced by the moral state of the heart, it could contain no virtue, nor be the object of a divine command. But I supposed it to be a persuasion of divine truth arising from the state of the heart, in the same sense as unbelief, which Mr. M. justly calls “its opposite.” Unbelief is not a mere mistake of the judgment, but a persuasion arising from aversion to the truth.
From the above, however, it would seem that we are agreed in making faith in Christ something which comprehends “true virtue,” or which is the same thing, true holiness. Yet Mr. M. will not abide by all or any of this. If he would, indeed there would be an end of the dispute. But he proceeds to reason in favor of that very“unfounded assertion,” for the making of which, I am unwarrantably accused of having been “too bold.” Thus he reasons in support of it:
“If mere belief contains no virtue, it would not follow that unbelief could contain no sin: for such an argument proceeds upon this principle: That if there is no virtue in a thing, there can be no sin in its opposite; but this does not hold true in innumerable instances. There is no positive virtue in abstaining from many crimes that might be mentioned; yet the commission of them, or even the neglect of the opposite duties, would be very sinful. There is no moral virtue in taking food when hungry; but to willfully starve one’s self to death would be suicide: and to come nearer the point, there is no moral virtue in believing the testimony of a friend, when I have every reason to do so; yet in these circumstances, if I were to discredit his word, he would feel the injury very sensibly. Now, supposing there was no more virtue contained in believing the witness of God, than in believing the witness of men, to which it is compared, it does not follow that there would be no sin in unbelief, which is to make God a liar. To deny that faith is the exercise of a virtuous temper of heart, is to refuse some praise to the creature. But to deny that unbelief is a sin, is to impeach the moral character of God… And “why so solicitous to find virtue, or moral excellence in faith?”
Now whether this reasoning is just or not, it must be allowed in order to prove that Mr. M., notwithstanding what he has said to the contrary, does not consider faith as containing any virtue. It is true, what he says is under a hypothetical form, and it may appear as if he were only allowing me my argument for the sake of overturning it. But it is manifestly his own principle which he labors to establish, and not mine; the very principle on which, as he conceives it, the freeness of justification depends. I cannot but express my surprise that so acute a writer should deal so largely in inconsistency.
Mr. M. cannot conceive of any end to be answered in finding moral excellence in faith, unless it be to give “some praise to the creature.” He doubtless means by this insinuation, to furnish an argument against it. So far as anything is praise-worthy which is spiritually good in us, and which is wrought by Him who works all our works in us, the same may be granted of faith. And as we should not think of denying that the one contains moral excellence, for the sake of humbling the creature, neither is there any ground for doing so with respect to the other.
But there are other ends to be answered by maintaining the holy nature of faith; and these are such ends that Mr. M. himself will not deny they are of importance.
—First, It is of importance that faith be considered as a duty: for if this is denied, Christ is denied the honor due to his name. But it is impossible to maintain that faith is a duty, if it contains no holy exercise of the heart. This, I presume, has already been made apparent. God requires nothing of intelligent creatures but what is holy.
— Secondly, It is of importance that the faith which we inculcate be genuine, or such as will carry us to heaven. But if it has no holiness in its nature, it is dead, and must be unproductive. Mr. M. considers true faith as the root of holiness. But if this is so, it must be holy itself; for the nature of the fruit corresponds with that of the root. If the difference between a living and dead faith do not consist in this — that the one is of a holy nature, and the other is not — I would be glad to be informed what it does consist in. And if the nature of the one is the same as that of the other, does the difference between them arise merely from circumstances?
— Thirdly, It is of importance that unbelief be allowed to be a sin, as it is that which, by Mr. M.’s acknowledgement,“impeaches the moral character of God.” . But if there be no holiness in faith, there can be no sin in its opposite. It is true that Mr. M. denies the principle of this argument, and speaks of “innumerable instances “of things which have no virtue, and yet the opposite of them is sin. This, I am persuaded, is not true. Whatever is the proper opposite of sin, is holiness. The instances which are given do not prove the contrary, such as abstinence from various crimes, eating when we are hungry, and believing a human testimony. There may indeed be no holiness in these things, as they are performed by apostate creatures. But if they were performed as God requires them to be (and which they should be in order to be the proper opposites to the sins referred to), they would be holy exercises. God requires us to abstain from all sin, out of a regard for His name; to eat and drink, and do whatever we do, even giving credit to the testimony of a friend “when we have reason to do so,” to his glory. These things thus performed, would be exercises of holiness.
I am aware that those who have opposed the doctrine of TOTAL DEPRAVITY have argued, that as being without natural affection is sin, so being possessed of it must be virtue.113 To this it has been justly answered, that though being without natural affection argues for the highest degree of depravity — as nothing else could overcome the common principles of human nature — yet it does not follow that mere natural affection is virtuous. For, if so, virtue would be found in animals. This answer is just, and sufficient to repel the objection on the subject of human depravity. But it will not apply to the case in hand. The question there relates to a matter of fact, or what men actually are; but here is a matter of right, or what they ought to be. Whatever is capable of being done by a moral agent, with an eye to the glory of God, ought to be done; and if it is, it is holy; if not, whatever may be thought of it by men, it is sinful. Natural affection itself, if subordinated to Him, would be sanctified, or rendered holy; and the same might be said of every natural inclination or action of life. It is thus that God would be served, even in our civil concerns; and holiness to the Lord would be written, as it were, upon the bells of the horses. Zec 14.20
I have known several persons in England who have agreed with Mr. M. as to faith belonging merely to the intellectual faculty, and the moral state of the heart having no influence upon it. But then they either denied, or have been very reluctant to own it to be duty. ‘The mind,’ they say,‘is passive in the belief of a proposition: we cannot believe as we will; but according to evidence. It may be our duty to examine that evidence; but as to faith, being altogether involuntary, it cannot be a duty.’
And if it is a mere passive reception of the truth, on which the state of the will has no influence, I do not perceive how this consequence can be denied. But then the same might be said of unbelief: ‘If evidence do not appear to us, how can we believe? It may be our sin not to examine. But as to our not believing, being altogether involuntary, it cannot be a sin.’ By this mode of reasoning, the sin of unbelief is explained away, and unbelievers commonly avail themselves of it for that purpose. As both these consequences (I mean denying that faith is a duty, and unbelief is a sin) are allowed by Mr. M., to be utterly repugnant to the Scriptures, it becomes him, if he will defend the premises, to show that they have no necessary connection.
The above reasoning might hold good, for all I know, in things which do not interest the heart. But to maintain it in things which do, especially in things of a moral and practical nature, is either to deny the existence of prejudice, or of its having any influence in hindering belief.
The author of Glad Tidings to perishing sinners,114 though he pleads for faith as including our receiving Christ, and coming to him; yet is decidedly averse to all holy disposition of the heart preceding it, not only as affording a warrant, but as being in any way necessary to the thing itself. And as he unites with Mr. Mc. Lean in considering the sinner as an enemy of God at the time of his being justified, he must, to be consistent, consider faith as having no holiness in its nature. His method of reasoning on the priority of repentance to believing, would seem to denote the same thing. He allows speculative repentance, or a change of mind which has “no holiness” in it, to be necessary to believing; giving this as the reason:
“While a sinner is either stupidly inattentive to his immortal interests, or expecting justification by his own obedience, he will not come to Christ.”
It would seem then, that aversion of heart to the gospel plan, or a desire to be justified by one’s own obedience, is no objection to coming to Christ; and that a sinner will come to him notwithstanding this, provided he is right in speculation, and his conscience sufficiently alarmed. If so, there certainly can be nothing spiritual or holy in the act of coming. The respect which I feel both towards Mr. Booth and Mr. Mc. Lean, is not a little; but no apology is needed for opposing these sentiments. Truth ought to be dearer to us than the greatest or best of men.
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